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7 In this issue, six authors discuss, from various perspectives,
8 the interaction between culture, evolution and institutions.
9 Kim Sterelny’s topic is language evolution, with its chal-
10 lenge being to develop an incremental model of change that
11 takes us by small improvements from the baseline commu-
12 nicative capacities of great apes to those of contemporary
13 humans, which, Sterelny argues with Jackendoff, are char-
14 acterized by expressive richness, i.e. the capacity to freely
15 innovate at the semantic level. A theory about language
16 evolution must be nested within an overall conception of the
17 evolution of social life (Tomasello 2008). Communication is
18 one form of cooperation, and the evolution of social life is
19 characterized by the expanding role of the economic basis of
20 cooperation. Sterelny argues that, at a first stage, signals are
21 meaningful without users’ being aware that they are mean-
22 ingful (Skyrms 2010). Signals, on the Lewis–Skyrms model,
23 depend on asymmetries between signaler and receiver: one
24 has access to information that the other lacks, and there must
25 be an overlap of interests between the agents. As the
26 recognition-signal-reception-action loop can be reflex-like,
27 we must ask how we get from a reflex-like communication
28 system to human language, with its key characteristic being
29 that communication is flexible and brought under intentional
30 control. Iconicity and association have a limited domain of
31 potential signals. Once the basic flow of communication
32 depends on arbitrary signals, it is harder to see how the
33 expressive powers of a community’s communicative prac-
34 tices could expand by happy accident in innovation and
35 response. Once gesture has become conventionalized, or
36replaced by arbitrary vocal signals, intention and interpre-
37tation seem to be essential. Signal uptake can no longer be
38mediated by associative links between the signal and the
39action or actor the signal labels. Sterelny holds that, once the
40mime-gesture system has begun to expand, and the menu of
41signals expands beyond those with associative links to
42functional, non-communicative actions, the uptake and
43spread of innovation in expressive power will dependmostly
44on intelligent innovation and response. The sign sequence
45must be successfully exploited by the audience, to allow the
46innovator and the audience to coordinate in action. Ster-
47elny’s paper finishes with a summary of empirical findings
48that link the changes in signaling capacities with technical,
49economic and social revolutions between 500,000 and
5080,000 years ago.
51Ramsey and De Block discuss a central divide between
52those approaches to culture that center on replicators (or
53memes) and those that center on organisms, and they
54provide an extensive argument for the superiority of the
55organism-centered view over the meme-centered view of
56cultural evolution. According to Dawkins and other
57memeticists, cultural traits spread not because they are
58useful for the individuals with these traits but, mainly (and
59often even solely), because they aid meme propagation. For
60those who favor the meme’s approach, the prototypical
61meme is the chain letter: a chain letter promises punish-
62ment for those who don’t distribute it further (or reward for
63those who do) and, hence, influences events such that it
64gets replicated over and over. The organism approach, on
65the other hand, takes the organisms and the cultural traits
66they adopt to be the locus of cultural evolutionary theory. It
67is concerned with understanding the spread and impact of
68cultural traits, but radically differs with respect to the
69question of what counts as an instance of replication.
70Replication, according to the approach Ramsey and De
A1 & Filip Buekens
A2 Filip.Buekens@hiw.kuleuven.be
A3 1 University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
A4 2 Tilburg University and KU Leuven, Louvain, Belgium
AQ1
123
Journal : Large 11245 Dispatch : 31-10-2015 Pages : 4
Article No. : 9359
h LE h TYPESET
MS Code : TOPO_SI (Intro) h CP h DISK4 4
Topoi
DOI 10.1007/s11245-015-9359-7
A
u
th
o
r
 P
r
o
o
f
U
N
C
O
R
R
E
C
T
E
D
P
R
O
O
F
71 Block favor, occurs when a naı¨ve individual adopts a
72 cultural variant whereas, for the memetic approach, repli-
73 cation can occur in the absence of organisms’ adopting the
74 variant.
75 Note that Ramsey and De Block do not argue that the
76 organism-based approach (OC) is always superior, or that it
77 is the only model of culture that one will ever need, but
78 that, for the majority of cases, the OC is both conceptually
79 and empirically superior. Their account therefore does not
80 preclude some sort of multi-level selection for culture: just
81 as in the case of biological evolution, where there can be
82 higher-level properties of groups that are not contained in
83 any individual—sex ratio, for example—there can also be
84 cultural traits that have not been adopted by any individual,
85 but that have nevertheless been adopted by a group. For
86 example, mask-making as a craft can be adopted by a
87 group of individuals while none of the individuals of the
88 group masters the craft as a whole. Organismic selection is
89 the primary engine of adaptive change in evolution. But
90 there are cases in which going up a level seems necessary,
91 especially when there are new properties that exist only at
92 the group level. (For Darwin in his (1871) Descent of Man,
93 the proportion of altruists was just such a property.) Other
94 cases are best understood as operating at the sub-organis-
95 mic, genic level. Meiotic drive is one such example—this
96 is a case in which particular alleles cheat the meiotic lottery
97 and get their copies into the next generation at a dispro-
98 portionately high frequency. When situations like this
99 occur in cultural evolution, it is prudent to resort to a
100 meme-centered approach. But, just as such situations are
101 not the dominant evolutionary force in organisms, so, they
102 suspect, is meme selection not the dominant force in
103 human cultural evolution (though this is, ultimately, an
104 empirical matter). If this is true, then, for the vast majority
105 of cases, the Organism will be the best approach to cultural
106 evolution.
107 Michael Vlerick’s paper (‘‘Explaining Universal Social
108 Institutions: A Game-Theoretic Approach’’) addresses a
109 question that remained largely neglected within classical
110 social ontology (Searle 2010; Tuomela 2007)—if it is true
111 that large parts of our institutions depend, for their exis-
112 tence, on their collective acceptance by social groups, how
113 is it that certain institutions (in particular, marriage, prop-
114 erty and the regulation of common resources) seem to exist
115 cross-culturally? This question, Vlerick contends, repre-
116 sents a challenge also for those theorists who, in contrast to
117 social ontologists, trace back the existence of institutions to
118 our mental wiring (Sperber 1996 and, more recently, Boyer
119 and Petersen 2012): these latter accounts (while correct in
120 highlighting the link between institutions and our mental
121 dispositions) are unable to explain why certain institutions
122 are universal or rather why similar institutions have
123 emerged independently in different cultural contexts.
124Vlerick’s suggestion is the following: by relying on
125work done by Bowles and Gintis (Bowles and Gintis 2011),
126the author accepts the idea that one possibility to explain
127the spreading of altruistic behavior (which, again, is a
128necessary ingredient for the large-scale cooperation typical
129of human societies) is that cooperating groups have sig-
130nificant advantages vis a` vis malfunctioning or non-coop-
131erating groups—and that the high level of cooperation in
132the first groups is enabled by universal institutions. Put
133differently, universal institutions are ‘‘fitness peaks in the
134landscape of cultural possibilities,’’ meaning that they
135secure altruism from free-riding behavior and, therefore,
136provide advantages at the group level. That is, a complete
137story of the emergence and development of institutions has
138to include their cultural dimension: institutions are (at least
139partly) products of cultural evolution.
140Against this conceptual background, Vlerick models
141three fundamental institutions (property, common man-
142agement and marriage) in game-theoretical terms by
143showing that institutions either modify the payoff matrix
144(insofar as, e.g., the institutions of property and common
145management introduce punishment for non-cooperative
146behavior) or create an additional motive to cooperate (in
147the case of marriage). And this fact, it is maintained, is the
148reason for their spreading through several cultures. This
149also leads the author to qualify institutions as ‘game-
150changers’ for, once established, they change the rules and
151structure of the games and, hence, their outcome.
152Institutions are also the topic of Jeppe Sinding Jensen’s
153article (‘‘How Institutions Work in Shared Intentionality
154and ‘We-Mode’ Social Cognition’’), but the perspective
155with which institutions are approached here differs from
156the one adopted by Vlerick (although both lines of rea-
157soning display important convergences, see below).
158Whereas Vlerick emphasizes the evolutionary dimension
159of institutions, Jensen’s starting point is recent work in the
160theory of social cognition (especially Gallotti and Frith
1612013) where he finds evidence for the idea that what social
162ontologists call the ‘‘we-mode’’ (cf. Tuomela 2007) has a
163neural correlate. The idea here is that the specific way of
164‘‘having’’ an intentional attitude from a group perspective
165(one which also allows one to talk of thinking, intending or
166emoting in the ‘‘we-mode’’) is something grounded in
167human neural architecture.
168However, it is contended that the introduction of this
169first level or basic kind of collective intentionality, legiti-
170mate as it is, is not yet sufficient to account for what Jensen
171calls ‘‘higher order shared intentionality.’’ What is missed
172here are social institutions along with the normativity that
173accompanies them. On the one hand, institutions provide
174‘‘cognitive governance’’ insofar as they act as stabilizers in
175social life, i.e., institutions seem to be able to reduce
176cognitive complexity, and they increase predictability in
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177 social interactions. On the other hand, they provide the
178 interactants with roles, scripts and patterns that normatively
179 shape their interaction.
180 Once institutions enter into the picture (and here a cer-
181 tain parallel with Vlerick’s ideas seems to arise), social
182 reality changes drastically, for institutions create ‘‘con-
183 texts’’ (i.e., normative programs for cognition, emotion and
184 practice) in which the human mind just thinks differently.
185 Jensen cashes out this idea by radicalizing Wilson’s ‘‘So-
186 cial Manifestation Thesis’’ (cf. Wilson 2004); in Jensen’s
187 words: ‘‘the social contexts are so ‘loaded’ by institutions
188 that the groups function as if they had group minds.’’ Said
189 another way, the basic we-mode is seen as the first step
190 towards establishing an institutional (and hence normative)
191 reality, which again is a crucial step in activating full-
192 blown collective intentionality. This makes human cogni-
193 tion predominantly cultural ‘‘in origins and in functions.’’
194 The idea that normativity is central for any account of
195 social reality (and even of collective intentionality), already
196 present in Jensen’s paper, figures even more prominently in
197 the article of Katharina Nieswandt, ‘‘Do Rights Exist by
198 Convention or by Nature?’’—where the focus is mainly put
199 on moral normativity. The paper defends two interrelated
200 claims: the first is that rights, all rights, exist by convention,
201 and the second is that conventionalism about rights does not
202 entail (cultural) relativism.
203 In her understanding of what a right is, Nieswandt fol-
204 lows Hohfeld (Hohfeld 1913): for a person to have a right
205 is nothing but for others to have a duty towards that person
206 to act in a particular way. According to the author, such
207 duties can be justified in two different ways—either the
208 justification solely appeals to the rules of a socially shared
209 pattern of acting that impose the relevant duties, or the
210 justification appeals to elements other than the rules of a
211 socially shared pattern of acting. In the first case, we have a
212 conventional right, in the second a right that, for the sake of
213 labeling alone, Nieswandt calls ‘‘natural.’’ (At this stage, it
214 might be important to mention that, although perhaps
215 irrelevant for the author’s argument, the idea of ‘‘rules of a
216 socially shared pattern of acting’’ closely resembles that of
217 institution discussed in the two previous papers.)
218 Nieswandt’s strategy is to show that, if this explanation
219 of the notion of a right is sound, then all attempts to justify
220 duties by recurring to the notion of a right necessarily lead
221 to circularity. But, more importantly, the author also
222 demonstrates that the attempts to justify duties (and, a
223 potiori, rights) by recurring to other facts, such as well-
224 being, autonomy and divine commands, are all doomed to
225 fail as they, too, run into circularity. The author does not
226 exclude the possibility that there may be other ‘‘natural
227 facts’’ that could come into consideration for the justifi-
228 cation of duties (and, hence, her discussion simply estab-
229 lishes that ‘‘none of the currently available naturalist
230justifications of rights is plausible, not that no plausible
231justification could ever be found,’’ our italics). And yet,
232apart from this caveat, her conclusion gives credence to the
233suggestion that there is no other way to justify duties than
234to ground them in shared patterns of acting.
235But, then, how to square the conventionalist claim with
236a non-relativist view? The proposal, roughly, is to separate
237the account of rights and duties from the account of the
238relevant practices (and corresponding rules) that generate
239those duties (and hence those rights). Said another way,
240practices justify rights but, if the practices are not justified
241themselves, then the alleged rights do not have normative
242power and, thus, do not have to be respected. However, the
243justification of (at least) some practices must appeal to
244something that does not exist by convention. Therefore,
245although the author agrees that this non-relativist stance
246would have to be spelled out in further detail, it seems
247plausible that conventionalism about rights does not imply
248relativism about practices.
249Corrado Roversi closes this issue with the introduction
250of the concept of institutional mimesis. According to the
251collective-intentionality view in social ontology, an insti-
252tution exists if a set of rules of this kind is collectively
253accepted within a given community. But, for the most part,
254these rules are internalized by way of socialization, and this
255is where culture steps in: they are internalized within a
256given cultural framework. Culture cannot but play a crucial
257role in explaining why constitutive connections are framed
258in this way, rather than in another, or why they cannot be
259arbitrarily changed. In other words, while the structure of
260an institution is provided by constitutive rules, the rationale
261behind those constitutive rules is provided by assumptions
262that are at least in part culturally transmitted, and these
263assumptions can be tacit and are always the outcome of a
264specific historical development. Roversi makes his case by
265referring to a wide range of historical studies on the origins
266of hierarchies (Dubreuil 2010), the origins of the modern
267conception of the state (Toulmin 1990), and the origins of
268contracts (Hagerstro¨m 1941).
269
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